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Recent Developments
Old Chiefv. United States

I

n a five to four decision, the
United States Supreme
Court in Old Chief v. United
States, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997), held
that where the sole purpose of
evidence was to prove the requisite
element of prior conviction, the
district court abused its discretion
by choosing to admit the full
record of a prior judgment despite
the petitioner's offer to admit to a
prior conviction. Consequently,
the petitioner, charged with
possession of a firearm by a felon,
was not allowed to stipulate to the
fact that he was a felon. In so
holding, the Court prevents the
prosecution from presenting the
fact-finder with evidence concerning a prior felony, in an attempt to
eliminate the prejudicial effect that
such evidence creates. Furthermore, this holding prevents the
Federal Rule of Evidence 403
balancing test, used to determine
whether the probative value of a
piece of evidence is substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial
effect, from being violated.
In 1993, Johnny Lynn Old
Chief ("Petitioner") was arrested
after an incident involving at least
Petitioner was
one gunshot.
charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for persons convicted of a
crime punishable by more than one
year imprisonment (i.e., a felony)
to possess a firearm. Petitioner
had previously been convicted of
assault causing serious bodily
injury.
At trial in the United States

Abuse Of Discretion
To Admit The Full
Record Of Prior
Judgment Of
Conviction When
Defendant Offers To
Stipulate
By Karen L. Sterner
District Court for the District of
Montana, fearing that such
evidence would prejudice the jury
against him, Petitioner offered to
stipulate to his prior felony conviction. The prosecution, however,
refused to accept the stipulation.
Petitioner argued that evidence of
the name and nature of his prior
conviction was inadmissible once
he had offered to stipulate to the
prior conviction element of his
current offense. Nonetheless, the
district court rejected Petitioner's
offer to concede to a prior
judgment and admitted the full
judgment record over his objection. Consequently, Petitioner was
convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, using or
carrying a firearm during the
commission of a violent crime and
assault with a dangerous weapon.
Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, stating that the
convictions resulted from the
prosecution's refusal to accept his
stipulation to the fact that he was a
felon. Petitioner contended that
the full evidentiary inclusion of his

prior conviction may have unduly
prejudiced the jury against him.
The court of appeals, however,
affirmed the district court conviction, holding that the government
was allowed to prove its case in
the manner the state considered
most effective. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari
to settle the divided treatment of
this issue by the circuit courts of
appeal.
Beginning its analysis, the
Court addressed Petitioner's threshold argument that his prior
conviction was not relevant to the
case at hand. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct.
644, 649 (1997). The Court, to the
contrary, found that his prior
conviction was essential to the
current charges because it showed
that he was "within the particular
sub-class of offenders for whom
firearms possession is outlawed by
§ 922(g)(1)." Id. By applying the
definition of relevant evidence, the
Court concluded that information
concerning Old Chief s prior
conviction was relevant because it
made it more probable than not
that he was a member in the subclass of offenders affected by §
922(g)(1). Id. at 649-50.
In evaluating the relative
weight and importance of the
evidence, the Supreme Court relied
on the balancing test prescribed by
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, that states even if
evidence is relevant it can be excluded if the "probative value [of
the evidence] is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 75
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prejudice." Id. at 650 (quoting
FED. R. EVID. 403). The Court
concluded that the prejudice to the
petitioner by refusing his stipulation and revealing his prior
conviction for assault to the jury
substantially outweighed the probative value of introducing the
evidence as proof of his prior conviction. Id.
The Court further characterized
"unfair prejudice" as when a factfinder improperly bases its decision of guilt on something other
than specific proof relating to the
charged offense. Id. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),
"evidence of other crimes, wrongs
or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity
therewith." Id. at 651 (citing FED.
R. EVID. 404(b)). Thus, propensity
character evidence is prohibited to
prove conduct. Id. While propensity evidence may be admissible for other purposes, it was
inapplicable in Petitioner's case.
Id.
In the Court's majority
opinion, unfair prejudice would
occur if evidence of a prior conviction was misused as propensity
evidence. Id. at 650. Moreover,
generalization via propensity evidence adversely affects defendants
by increasing the chances that a
fact-finder will view them as likely
to have committed the crime with
which they are currently charged.
Id. Accordingly, evidence of a
prior conviction is subject to analysis for probative value and for
prejudicial risk of misuse as
propensity evidence. Id. at 651.
Available substitutes and alter27.2 U. BaIt. L.F. 76

natives to proffered prejudicial
evidence also need to be evaluated
in terms of whether they are of less
prejudicial but equally probative
value. Id. at 652. In its analysis,
the Court referred to the Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 403, that
caution a court that is considering
whether to exclude evidence on
grounds of unfair prejudice to
evaluate the "availability of other
means of proof' as a factor. Id. at
652 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403
advisory committee's notes).
Case law supports the
contention that the government
may prove its case by evidence of
its choice. Id. at 653 (citing Parr
v. United States, 255 F.2d 86 (5th
Cir. 1958)).
In the Court's
opinion, however, "[t]he issue is
not whether concrete details of the
prior crime should come to the
jurors' attention but whether the
name or general character of that
crime is to be disclosed." Id. at
655. The Court concluded that
disclosure of the fact of the qualifying conviction is what matters
under the statute. Id. Finally, the
Court noted that "there is no
cognizable difference between the
evidentiary significance of an admission and of the legitimately
probative component of the
official record the prosecution
would prefer to place in evidence."
Id. The latter carries with it,
however, an inherent risk of unfair
prejUdice. Id. Therefore, the
Court determined it was an abuse
of discretion to admit the record, in
as much as the probative value
associated with the conviction did
not substantially outweigh its dan-

ger of unfair prejudice. Id.
Furthermore, the Court was.
careful to confine the scope of its
ruling to stipulations concerning
proof of a defendant's legal status,
and not to other situations at trial
where stipulations may be
attempted. Id. at 655-656. A
criminal defendant may not, for
example, attempt to lessen the
impact of the prosecution's evidentiary case with regard to his or
her participation in the commission of the crime for which the
defendant is being tried. Id. at
653.
Additionally, the Court offered
alternatives to a formal stipulation
for the record that, when coupled
with a proper objection at trial,
would require a district court to
exclude evidence of the name of
the offense because of its
prejudicial effect. Id. at 655 n.l O.
The most commonly used is a
redacted record of a conviction.
Id. The Court recognized that by
choosing such an alternative, a
jury instruction would be necessary to clearly and fully explain its
meaning, i.e., that it was sufficient
to satisfy the required status
element. Id.
In her dissenting opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas,
Justice O'Connor stated that the
majority misapplied Federal Rule
of Evidence 403. Id. at 656. The
dissent first pointed out that
"virtually all evidence is prejudicial" or it would not be relevant. Id. (citing Dollar v. Long
Mfg., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th
Cir. 1977)). The dissenters posited
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that the key to the admission of the
evidence was whether or not the
prejudice created by the admission
was unfair. Id. at 657 Furthermore, the dissent argued that any
prejudicial effect of refusing the
stipulation and admitting evidence
of a prior conviction could be
rectified by a proper jury instruction. Id at 658. Lastly, the dissent
was troubled by "the Court's
retreat from the fundamental prin-

ciple that in a criminal prosecution
the Government may prove its case
as it sees fit." Id at 658. The
dissent regarded this action as a
preclusion of the government's
ability to offer evidentiary testimony to adequately and effectively
prove a necessary element of its
case. Id.
With its decision in Old Chief
v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court settled the dispute

among the circuits concerning the
acceptance of criminal stipulations, and adopted the Fourth
Circuit's view that criminal stipulations regarding prior crimes
must be accepted by the prosecution. Although this case involved
the federal rules, Maryland, as well
as other states, could be impacted
because of the similarity between
state and federal evidentiary rules.
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